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The paper reexamines empirically the robustness of competing theories of foreign
aid e⁄ectiveness. By shifting the focus from the e⁄ects of aid on income to to
e⁄ects of aid on productivity, it is possible to put to test 3 existing theories of
foreign aid e⁄ectiveness. The results provide support for the hypotheses that (i)
aid has a positive e⁄ect in fostering growth of average productivity, (ii) aid doesn￿ t
operate with diminishing returns, and (iii) the magnitude of the total e⁄ect depends
on climate-related circumstances. The results support the policy recommendation
previously made in the literature to seriously reconsider the conditionality rule for
foreign aid disbursements.
1 Introduction
Mexico hosted in March 2002 the UN International Conference on Financing for Devel-
opment, which was carried out to confront in a global forum the challenge of ￿nding the
best way to ￿nance development. One of the outcomes of the conference was a report
containing the guidelines that any comprehensive and coordinated response to this prob-
lem should follow. This report, the Monterrey consensus, contains a section on the role
that foreign aid (o¢ cial development assistance) plays, and highlights its relevance as ￿a
complement to other sources of ￿nancing for development, especially in those countries
with the least capacity to attract private direct investment￿(UN, 2002).
The central role foreign aid has been recognized in various occasions before and after
the Monterrey consensus. In many of those occasions, the recongnition of aid￿ s importance
was even complemented with commitments to increase the amount of resources from donor
countries, and with commitments to coordinate the actions of recipients, donors and
1international institutions to make foreign aid more e⁄ective instrument (see for example
the G8 Gleneagles communiquØ, 2005).
A remarkable feature of this whole process is, however, that even though the idea
of coordinating actions and making foreign aid more e⁄ective is widely accepted as a
priority now, there doesn￿ t exist yet a relatively high degree of consensus about the way
that foreign aid works, at least not one that allows to assert a conclusive argument about
the capacity of foreign aid to promote faster economic growth. As noted in a recent
work trying to encompass the conclusions from a number of empirical papers using cross-
country data to assess the e⁄ects of aid on growth, it is necessary to recognize that ￿[...]
one can ￿nd signi￿cant impacts of aid on growth￿ positive and negative￿ but these do
not hold up when we check their robustness to the considerable choice of speci￿cations at
the researcher￿ s disposal. In short, it is di¢ cult to discern any systematic e⁄ect of aid on
growth in the panel context also￿(Rajan and Subramanian, 2005).
The objective of this paper is to reexamine empirically the capacity of foreign aid to
imporove the economic performance, but concentrating this time on an angle that has
received virtually no attention. The empirical literature has basically tried to ￿nd an
estimate of the e⁄ect of aid on the average growth rate of GDP per capita (interpreting
it as a measure of change in the average level of income or as a broad indicator of the
change in the country￿ s general economic conditions). Here the aim is trying to re￿ne
the understanding of the connection between aid and growth, by moving the focus to the
impact of aid on productivity. The yardstick for the e⁄ectiveness of aid throughout the
paper will be then the average rate of growth in GDP per worker.
This change of measure is relevant for several reasons. First, GDP per worker is a
direct measure of the average productivity of labor but can still be interpreted as a proxy
for average income. With an appropriate scalation of prices, the measure becomes useful
to make proper comparisons of productivity and e¢ ciency across countries. Growth in real
GDP per worker is, for example, one of the central criterion to judge business productivity
in the annual report from the World Competitiveness Center (see IMD, 2005). Second,
as pointed by Jones (1997), if one is interested in making some sort of welfare comparison
across countries, it is preferable to use GDP per worker instead of GDP per capita since
￿one does not want to follow the national accounts data in drawing a distinction between
market production and home or nonmarket production￿ . Third, according to Durlauf,
Johnson and Temple (2004), the use of GDP per worker is sometimes the best alternative
when trying to test the predictions of formal growth models, since these are generally
￿based on production functions and their implications relate more closely to GDP per
worker than GDP per capita￿ . And fourth, Durlauf et al. (2005) also recall that when
there is an unmeasured non-market sector in the economy, such as subsistence agriculture,
GDP per worker could be a more accurate index of average productivity than GDP per
capita. This argument extends immediately to the activities in the unmeasured market
2sector, and particularly so in developing countries where unmeasured economic activity
tends to account for an important fraction of the overall level of product in the economy.
The objective throughout the paper will be basically twofold. By using a panel of
data at the country level, the initial goal is to tell something about the capacity of aid to
increase productivity. The assessment will be done within the borders that the existing
literature on foreign aid e⁄ectiveness has set, because this would allow also to see if some
of the existing theories on foreign aid e⁄ectiveness can stand up to a change in the data
used to support them.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shortly reviews some of the main theories
in the recent e⁄ectiveness debate. Section 3 discusses methodological issues invloved on
the estimation part. Section 4 presents results of the estimations and the tests applied,
and o⁄ers a general discussion. Section 5 ends the paper with some concluding remarks.
2 Competing theories of foreign aid e⁄ectiveness
Most recent formal models of aid e⁄ectiveness have their foundations on di⁄erent types
of augmented growth models. Burnside and Dollar (2000), a seminal contribution to
this literature, based their empirical results on the framework of a modi￿ed neoclassical
growth model. They relied on the following two reduced-form equations for the rate of
growth in GDP per capita and the allocation of aid:
git = yit￿y + p
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where i indexes countries and t time, git is the growth rate in GDP per capita, yit is
the initial level of (log) GDP per capita, ait is the amount of aid received relative to the
GDP, pit is a P ￿ 1 vector of policies that a⁄ect growth, zit is a K ￿ 1 vector of other
exogenous variables that might a⁄ect growth and the allocation of aid, gt and at are ￿xed
time e⁄ects, and "
g
it and "a
it are mean zero random errors.
A system of these two equations allows them to treat growth, aid and the quality of
macroeconomic policies as endogenous regressors in the equations they estimate. The
basic regression-equation in Burnside and Dollar (2000) looks like
git = yit￿y + p
0
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where bp is a vector containing the speci￿c weights for the policy index. The coe¢ cients of
interest in these regressions are the ones related to the aid variable and the aid-interacted
terms.
3Using a panel of data for 56 countries, with observations averaged over 4 years during
the period between 1966 and 1993, Burnside and Dollar￿ s (2000) ￿nd that aid accelerates
growth in developing countries with ￿scal budget surpluses, low in￿ ation and policies of
open trade (a combination of ￿good￿policies); but also that aid has ￿less or no e⁄ect
in countries in which institutions and policies are poor￿(Burnside and Dollar, 2004). In
terms of their regression results, they ￿nd that aid itself has a small and statistically
insigni￿cant e⁄ect, but once interacted with the policy variable aid has a signi￿cantly
positive coe¢ cient. The result is reported to be robust to di⁄erent sampling and the
endogenous nature of aid. This is illustrated in columns (1) and (2) in the Table 1,
where the results of regressions (5.OLS) and (8.2SLS) in Burnside and Dollar (2000) are
recreated.
The basic result from Burnside and Dollar (2000) has been quite controversial within
the academia (it has received strong criticism from a number of researchers) but has been
strongly in￿ uential in environments where donors design their aid policies. The World
Bank, for example, based some of the central conclusions of its policy research report on
aid e⁄ectiveness (WB, 1998) on the policy recommendations following from Burnside and
Dollar￿ s work.
One of the important critics to Burnside and Dollar (2000) was made by Dalgaard
and Hansen (2001). The critic attacks essentially the selectivity rule that follows from
Burnside and Dollar￿ s work, namely the implication that donors should direct the aid
resources to countries with ￿good￿economic policy.
Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) use a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans type of model extended
in two dimensions. First, they introduce aid transfers and consider them as pure income
transfers to the budget of the representative consumer. Second, they introduce a source of
risk for ￿rms, assuming that with probability (1￿p) output is destroyed as a consequence
of social unrest, riots, etc. This source of risk is parameterized under the assumptions
that p varies positively with both the level of consumption and the relative size of the
government expenditure (equal to the size of tax revenues under the assumption of a
balanced ￿scal budget).
The theoretical model provides a number of interesting results, among them that (1)
aid has an unconditional positive e⁄ect on the long-run; (2) after a certain level, more
aid operates with diminishing returns (its positive e⁄ect on capital accumulation becomes
smaller); and (3) the connection between aid and good policies is a priori ambiguous.
The third result arises by bearing in mind that good policies do have an in￿ uence if they
a⁄ect the way in which aid maps into growth, i.e., policies matter if they change the
marginal e⁄ect of consumption on the return probability p, @p=@c. In this setting, if aid
and good policies are ￿substitutes￿(in the sense that better policies reduce @p=@c), better
policies are good for growth but at the same time can be bad for aid (i.e. they reduce aid
e⁄ectiveness). Conversely, if aid and policies are ￿complements￿ , better policies are good
4for both growth and aid when the initial level of expenditures is low, or good for growth
but bad for aid when the initial level of expenditures is high.
The empirical work in Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) fully supports their theoretical
model. Using the Burnside and Dollar (2000) data set, they show that (1) aid has a
positive unconditional impact on income per capita; (2) aid operates with decreasing
returns; and (3) the coe¢ cient on the aid-policy interaction term is small and positive
but statistically highly insigni￿cant. These results are shown in columns (3) and (4) in
Table 1, where the results from equations (7) and (8) in Dalgaard and Hansen￿ s (2001)
Table 4 are recreated.
Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) are taken here as rep-
resenting two opposed and competing views on foreign aid e⁄ectiveness. However, it is
also worthy to include the work by Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004), since they take
explicitly into account the role that deep structural characteristics of the economy play
(climate-related circumstances).
Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004) use an overlapping-generations model extended
with an aid in￿ ux and show that ￿[1] policies matter by themselves, and su¢ ciently bad
policies can make aid ine⁄ective for growth, [2] the marginal impact of aid on productivity
seems to diminish as the size of the in￿ ow increases, [3] the interaction between aid
and policies turns out to be insigni￿cant, [and 4] fundamental (non political) structural
characteristics matter for the return to foreign aid￿ . The empirical results from Dalgaard,
Hansen and Tarp (2004) are shown in column (5) in Table 1, where the results in their
regression (6), Table 1, are recreated.
The di⁄erent results following from the 3 competing theories of aid e⁄ectiveness just
presented here can be displayed in a transparent way by using Dalgaard, Hansen and
Tarp￿ s (2004) eq. 5. This is a reduced form equation for productivity in the long run,
modeled as a function ￿(￿) of foreign aid x, policies ￿, and other relevant variables ￿ (which
comprises among others the fundamental structural characteristics in the economy):
y
￿ = ￿(x;￿;￿). (4)
According to the 3 papers reviewed here, @y￿=@a > 0. The debate has basically
been concentrated on the relative importance of second order e⁄ects, i.e., the size and
signi￿cance of @2y￿=@x@￿ and @2y￿=@x2. Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004) claim that
@2y￿=@x@￿ > 0. Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) and Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004) on
the other hand claim that @2y￿=@x@￿ ￿ 0 but @2y￿=@x2 < 0.
These are the conceptual problems that I will concentrate on throughout the rest of
the paper.
53 Methodological issues in aid-growth regressions
One of the central methodological issues in aid-growth regressions is the endogenous
character of aid: it￿ s true that aid can be seen as a key input for the growth process, but
it￿ s necessary to recognize that aid is determined to a large extent by the growth process
itself. All the recent empirical literature of foreign aid e⁄ectiveness has recognized this
problem, and almost all have responded to it recurring to instrumental variables (IV)
estimation. An advantage of IV is that it provides a general solution to the problem (of
course it￿ s not the only available solution), and that various tests for the validity of the
instruments and the quality of ￿t can be performed within this framework. For the sake of
comparability with the results in the reviewed literature, the paper relies on instrumental
variables estimation.
The tables reported in the paper display standard errors that are robust to autocorrela-
tion and heteroskedasticity, but also to arbitrary intra-group correlation (clustering). The
tables also present some measures to assess the quality of the instrumentation procedures.
First, a test for relevance of the instruments is presented using the Anderson canonical
correlations LR test of whether the equation is identi￿ed. The test is basically a check of
relevance of the excluded instruments (the exogenous variables not included in the second
stage regression). The test statistic is built under the null hypothesis that the rank of the
coe¢ cients matrix in the reduced form equation is K￿1, where K is the total number of ￿
included and excluded￿regressors. The statistic is a measure of the instruments relevance
(i.e. the correlation with the part of the endogenous regressors that cannot be explained
by other instruments), so a rejection of the null indicates that the model is identi￿ed and
that the instruments are relevant. (It is important to bear in mind all the caution notes
provided in Hall, Rudebusch and Wilcox, 1996, concerning the application of this test.)
Second, a test for the validity of the instruments is also applied (a test for no correlation
of the instruments with the error term), by means of a Sargan test of overidentifying
restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the excluded instruments are not correlated with
the error term (i.e. that they are ￿correctly￿excluded from the equation). Under this null
the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of
overidentifying restrictions. Rejection of the null hypothesis points to the presence of not
valid instruments.
Finally, partial R2 measures for the ￿rst stage regressions are reported, taking into
account the presence of more than one endogenous regressors in many of the equations.
This is done by applying the procedure described in Shea (1997). The partial R2 measures
complement the information about relevance of the instrumentation procedures.
64 Foreign aid and productivity
Tables 2 and 3 present the results from the estimation of the e⁄ects of aid on productivity.
The data set employed is the same as in Burnside and Dollar (2000), augmented by the
variable on the proportion of tropical land in the country used in Dalgaard, Hansen and
Tarp (2004). The new feature in this paper is the use of growth in productivity as the
dependent variable, instead of growth in GDP per capita. It was possible to use two
di⁄erent measures for the countries￿productivity: the ￿rst based on the GDP per person
in the labor force (a common proxy for productivity), and the second on the GDP per
employed person (following the criteria adopted by the World Competitiveness Center).
Both variables were constructed using the data from the World Development Indicators
2004 (World Bank, 2004).
Table 2 presents the results of the equations where the dependent variable is the
average growth in GDP per person in the labor force.1 Columns (6) and (7) correspond
to the speci￿cation of Burnside and Dollar (2000, eq. 5.OLS and 8.2SLS). Column (8)
corresponds to the speci￿cation in Dalgaard and Hansen (2001, eq. 8), and column (9)
corresponds to the speci￿cation in Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004, eq. 6).
Results for the coe¢ cients of interest in Table 2 are very similar in the orders of
magnitude to the ones presented in Table 1, where the results of the original models are
recreated. Columns (6) and (7), which in some sense put Burnside and Dollar￿ s (2000)
model to test, support essentially the same type of conclusions as in their paper: aid
doesn￿ t seem to foster productivity by itself, but only when combined with the index of
￿good￿policies. This result holds under the same type of circumstances as in the original
paper, namely, the results appear to be robust to a change in the estimation method,
and to a strong change in the sample (equations [1] and [6] use the full original Burnside
and Dollar sample of 56 low and middle income countries, while equations [2] and [7] use
a sample of 40 low income countries). The statistics reported to assess the quality of
the instrumentation reveal that the aid and the aid*policy variables loose some of their
power as valid and relevant instruments (lower partial R2 coe¢ cients, lower statistics for
the Sargan and Anderson tests), but fundamentally they remain as strong instruments as
they are in the original model.
In columns (8) and (9), that confront the original results in Dalgaard and Hansen
(2001) and Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004), the new results show again that the re-
sults in the original models stand up well to a change in the dependent variable. The
most important change appears to be concentrated on the hypothesis of diminishing re-
turns. The coe¢ cient on aid squared looses some statistical signi￿cance in the Dalgaard
and Hansen (2001) speci￿cation, and turns to be statistically insigni￿cant under the Dal-
1GDP per person in the labor force is constructed as the ratio between real GDP measured in constant
1995 USD and the total size of the labor force. The data source is the World Development Indicators
2004 data set from the World Bank.
7gaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004) setup. The coe¢ cient on the aid term however remains
signi￿cant and positive, suggesting that aid by itself has positive e⁄ects in terms of fos-
tering productivity. The new results don￿ t show any substantial change in the role that
structural or climate-related factors in the economy play, i.e., the coe¢ cients on the term
on the fraction of tropical land in the country and the term interacted with aid remain
highly signi￿cant. This suggests that ￿deep￿structural characteristics in the country are
a central determinant for the pace at which average productivity in the country grows.
The results in Table 2 seem to indicate that the three competing theories for aid
e⁄ectiveness are essentially robust, in the sense that they hold despite the measure of aid￿ s
￿e⁄ectiveness￿is shifted from average income (GDP per capita) to average productivity.
This is, however, not a very surprising result. Levels of GDP per person in the labor force
and levels of GDP per capita tend to vary in a similar way, basically because they are both
determined by demographic variables that tend to move rather slowly. The correlation
between the two variables in the data set used is 0.93; and the means of average growth
in GDP per capita and growth in GDP per person are around 1.16% and 1.13% per year.
The basic demographic determinants behind the two variables are the ones determining
the changes in the labor force participation across countries (among the most direct
ones: fertility decisions and mortality rates). So, in some sense, the evidence presented
indicating that aid is as e⁄ective in fostering growth as it is in fostering productivity,
can also be used to support the idea that aid has been ine⁄ective to change the course of
central demographic variables, in particular the ones determining the rates of participation
in the labor force.
Coming back to the initial question of whether aid has an e⁄ect on the growth rate
of productivity, it is possible to repeat the estimations made in Table 2, but using this
time as the endogenous variable the growth rate of GDP per person employed.2 Table 3
presents the new results.
Columns (10) and (11) tell basically that the results in Burnside and Dollar (2000) fade
away when the dependent variable is replaced by the growth in GDP per person employed:
none of the coe¢ cients of interest appear to be signi￿cant now, and the statistics to assess
quality of the instruments show that the set of instruments chosen is signi￿cantly valid
now only at the 6% level (before it was signi￿cantly valid at the 1% level). Results from
column (12) represent something similar for the story in Dalgaard and Hansen (2001).
Nevertheless, results from column (13) show support for the basic results in Dalgaard,
Hansen and Tarp (2004). The only change compared to the original model is that the
coe¢ cient on aid squared turns out to be insigni￿cant (the same as in regression [9] in
2GDP per person employed is the ratio between real GDP (measured in constant 1995 USD) and total
employment. Total employment is de￿ned as the part of the total population that is not unemployed.
The de￿nition of unemploymnt used in the WDI refers to the "share of the labor force that is without
work but available for and seeking employment". The WDI also notes that de￿nitions of labor force and
unemployment di⁄er by country. See WB, 2004, for details on the series of total unemployment.
8Table 2).
Results from Table 3 must be handled with care. The new dependent variable (GDP
per person employed) is not observed in many countries, which results in a large attrition
of the sample (basically 80% of the sample becomes unavailable). However, the data is still
available for half the number of countries, so results from Table 3 can still be considered
as containing some information.
That said, results in column (13) can be taken as pointing to validate the conclusions
from models where aid has a positive and signi￿cant impact in the economy in terms of
fostering, unconditionally, the growth in average income as well as in average productivity.
An interesting result is also that the hypothesis of diminishing receives no support from
the data when the focus of aid e⁄ectiveness is put on average productivity rather than
average income. Finally, one of the central features turns to be the robustness of the
variable proxying for structural characteristics in the economy. The coe¢ cients for the
fraction of tropical lands and the fraction of tropical lands interacted with aid increase
in magnitude when the measure of aid e⁄ectivness is a more accurate measure of average
productivity. These, combined with an increased coe¢ cient on the aid term, basically
support and emphasize the idea that good structural characteristics and institutional
quality are some of the channels that foreign aid uses to produce results.
5 Conclusion
By focusing on a di⁄erent variable to judge the macro e⁄ects of foreign aid, it has been
possible to test the reobustness of three competing theories in the aid e⁄ectiveness lit-
erature, namely the theory that aid works conditionally on good policies (Burnside and
Dollar, 2000), the theory that aid works unconditionally but with diminhing returns (Dal-
gaard and Hansen, 2001), and the theory that aid works, but the magnitude of the e⁄ect
depends on climate-related factors (Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp, 2004).
The results in Tables 2 and 3 in this paper give support to the argument in Dalgaard,
Hansen and Tarp (2004) results. The results indicate that, based on cross-country data,
aid appears to have a positive impact in terms of fostering growth of average income as
well as growth of average productivity. The e⁄etc is shown to be independent of the role
that policies and institutions play, but dependent on the structural characteristics of the
economy (climate-related circumstanes). These results must be taken with care, given the
nature of the data used, but also because they don￿ t necessarily extrapolate to the future.
The results esentially tell hat aid has worked for the average country, and it has worked
better in countries with better institutional quality and structural characteristics.
An implication from the results is that the aid policy of conditionality on "good"
policies (policies promoting ￿scal budget surpluses, low in￿ ation and openess to trade)
doesn￿ t receive support from this paper.
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10Table 1
Aid-growth regressions on GDP per capita growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Initial per capita GDP (log) -0.60 -0.83 -0.01 0.01 -0.07
(0.50) (0.77) (0.56) (0.54) (0.43)
Ethnic fract. -0.42 -0.67 0.55 0.57 1.01
(0.88) (0.84) (0.96) (0.93) (0.80)
Asssasinations -0.45 ** -0.76 * -0.46 * -0.45 * -0.37 *
(0.21) (0.44) (0.24) (0.24) (0.20)
Asssasinations * Ethnic fr. 0.79 ** 0.63 0.89 * 0.88 * 0.72 *
(0.40) (0.90) (0.46) (0.46) (0.40)
Institutional quality 0.69 ** 0.84 ** 0.85 ** 0.86 ** 0.79 **
(0.17) (0.19) (0.26) (0.26) (0.22)
M2 / GDP, lagged 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.87 ** -2.11 ** -2.95 ** -2.98 ** -2.65 **
(0.74) (0.73) (1.17) (1.14) (1.04)
East Asia 1.31 ** 1.46 ** 1.31 * 1.32 1.94 **
(0.66) (0.71) (0.77) (0.80) (0.68)
Burnside-Dollar policy index 0.71 ** 0.59 0.93 ** 0.97 ** 0.84 **
(0.20) (0.38) (0.30) (0.19) (0.17)
Policy index squared 0.01
(0.06)
Aid (EDA / GDP, %) -0.02 -0.24 1.31 ** 1.34 ** 2.46 **
(0.18) (0.26) (0.64) (0.63) (0.58)
Aid squared -0.13 ** -0.13 ** -0.10 *
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Aid * policy index 0.19 ** 0.25 ** 0.01
(0.08) (0.12) (0.07)
Fraction of land in tropics -1.47 **
(0.69)
Aid * Fraction of land in tropics -1.34 **
(0.62)
Shea partial R2:
   Aid (EDA / GDP, %) 0.39 0.53 0.53 0.71
   Aid squared 0.49 0.46 0.62
   Aid * policy index 0.58 0.69
   Aid * Fraction of land in tropics 0.73
Identification/IV relevance test:
   Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic 88.92 136.41 131.70 123.06
   p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overidentification test of all instruments:
   Sargan-Hansen J statistic 10.48 1.92 1.88 1.11
   p-value 0.23 0.75 0.87 0.95
Countries 56 40 54 54 54
Observations 270 184 223 223 223
R2 0.39 0.47 0.36 0.36 0.42
Note: The dependent variable is average growth in real GDP per capita. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. All regressions include time dummies. Instruments in regressions (2) - (5) listed as in Table
5 in Dalgaard and Hansen (2001).
11Table 2
Aid growth regressions on growth in GDP per person in the labor force
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Initial per capita GDP (log) -0.30 -0.79 ** -0.08 -0.12
(0.32) (0.33) (0.37) (0.33)
Ethnic fract. -0.19 -1.05 0.70 1.18
(0.93) (0.94) (1.06) (0.96)
Asssasinations -0.52 ** -0.89 ** -0.51 ** -0.41 **
(0.23) (0.42) (0.25) (0.20)
Asssasinations * Ethnic fr. 1.02 ** 0.82 1.06 ** 0.85 **
(0.42) (0.87) (0.46) (0.38)
Institutional quality 0.56 ** 0.72 ** 0.77 ** 0.68 **
(0.14) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19)
M2 / GDP, lagged 0.02 0.04 ** 0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.01 -1.32 * -2.17 ** -1.81 **
(0.77) (0.77) (0.98) (0.86)
East Asia 0.77 1.21 * 0.64 1.24 **
(0.57) (0.67) (0.67) (0.58)
Burnside-Dollar policy index 0.83 ** 0.53 1.06 ** 0.94 **
(0.22) (0.37) (0.19) (0.18)
Aid (EDA / GDP, %) 0.03 -0.37 1.10 * 2.11 **
(0.16) (0.30) (0.60) (0.44)
Aid squared -0.10 * -0.07
(0.05) (0.06)
Aid * policy index 0.17 ** 0.35 **
(0.07) (0.13)
Fraction of land in tropics -1.64 **
(0.68)
Aid * Fraction of land in tropics -1.26 **
(0.51)
Shea partial R2:
   Aid (EDA / GDP, %) 0.32 0.53 0.73
   Aid squared 0.45 0.63
   Aid * policy index 0.48
   Aid * Fraction of land in tropics 0.75
Identification/IV relevance test:
   Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic 70.36 130.81 121.32
   p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overidentification test of all instruments:
   Sargan-Hansen J statistic 8.06 3.04 6.98
   p-value 0.43 0.69 0.22
Countries 54 38 53 53
Observations 271 185 224 224
R2 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.43
Note: The dependent variable is average growth in real GDP per person in the labor
force. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions include time dummies.
Instruments in regressions (7) - (9) listed as in Table 5 in Dalgaard and Hansen (2001).
12Table 3
Aid-growth regressions on growth in GDP per person employed
(10) (11) (12) (13)
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Initial per capita GDP (log) -1.69 ** -6.33 ** -1.04 0.29
(0.79) (2.00) (0.87) (0.84)
Ethnic fract. -3.43 -16.03 ** -1.09 4.28
(2.58) (5.56) (2.11) (2.75)
Asssasinations -0.34 -1.98 -0.33 0.00
(0.34) (1.72) (0.34) (0.35)
Asssasinations * Ethnic fr. 1.20 4.07 1.45 1.82 **
(0.88) (2.80) (0.94) (0.71)
Institutional quality 0.52 1.38 1.04 2.59 **
(0.76) (0.80) (0.77) (0.95)
M2 / GDP, lagged 0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.11
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07)
East Asia 1.96 3.33 1.52 2.83 **
(1.82) (2.11) (1.72) (1.23)
Burnside-Dollar policy index 0.02 0.25 0.33 0.23
(0.42) (1.25) (0.33) (0.34)
Aid (EDA / GDP, %) -1.40 -3.27 -0.11 6.46 **
(1.25) (1.91) (1.01) (3.13)
Aid squared 0.02 -0.11
(0.11) (0.11)
Aid * policy index 0.29 1.29
(0.44) (0.84)
Fraction of land in tropics -2.82 **
(1.15)
Aid * Fraction of land in tropics -4.11 *
(2.15)
Shea partial R2:
   Aid (EDA / GDP, %) 0.74 0.72 0.82
   Aid squared 0.78 0.90
   Aid * policy index 0.62
   Aid * Fraction of land in tropics 0.90
Identification/IV relevance test:
   Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic 24.26 71.57 30.36
   p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overidentification test of all instruments:
   Sargan-Hansen J statistic 13.63 9.93 9.54
   p-value 0.06 0.04 0.05
Countries 25 12 26 26
Observations 54 25 56 56
R2 0.40 0.81 0.38 0.33
Note: The dependent variable is average growth in real GDP per person employed.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions include time dummies.
Instruments in regressions (11) - (13) listed as in Table 5 in Dalgaard and Hansen
(2001).
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